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Conventional wisdom says that commitment eliminates the inflationary bias of monetary
policy. However, this paper shows that the inflation bias can persist even when the central
bank commits. A simple model is presented in which the central bank precommits by
setting the policy instrument, and the subsequent adjustment of inflation expectations is
part of the transmission mechanism. Generally there is still an inflation bias, despite the
absence of a time-inconsistency problem. It is caused by uncertainty about the economic
disturbances to which the central bank responds. Only perfect transparency about economic
information completely eliminates the inflation bias.
JEL E42, E 52, E58Zusammenfassung
Üblicherweise wird angenommen, dass ein Inflationsbias verschwindet, wenn sich eine
Zentralbank glaubwürdig im voraus auf ihre Politik festlegt. Dieses Papier zeigt, dass ein
Inflationsbias trotzdem fortbestehen kann. Es wird ein einfaches Modell dargestellt, in dem
die Zentralbank im voraus ihre Instrumente festlegt und die anschließende Anpassung der
Inflationserwartungen Teil des Transmissionsprozesses ist. Im allgemeinen existiert ein
Inflationsbias weiter, obwohl kein Zeitinkonsistenzproblem mehr auftritt. Ursache ist die
Unsicherheit über die ökonomischen Störungen, auf die die Zentralbank reagiert. Nur
vollkommene Transparenz hinsichtlich der Informationen beseitigt vollständig den
Inflationsbias.Contents
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The optimal design of economic policy in the presence of rational expecta-
tions is a topic of active research. A prominent example is the inﬂationary bias
of discretionary monetary policy that has dominated much of the literature on
monetary policy since the inﬂuential work by Kydland and Prescott (1977). As
is well known, the inﬂation bias arises when monetary policymakers are unable
to commit themselves and aim to stimulate output beyond the natural rate. The
socially optimal outcome is unattainable because the central bank takes the in-
ﬂation expectations of the private sector as given, either strategically (in a Nash
equilibrium), or due to the timing of events (when expectations are incorporated
in contracts). From this literature it is easy to conclude that the inﬂation bias van-
ishes if the central bank commits itself every period by moving ﬁrst, and people
subsequently adjust their expectations.
This paper shows, however, that the inﬂationary bias of monetary policy typi-
callypersistsevenifthecentralbankﬁrstsetsthepolicyinstrumentandthemarket
then forms its inﬂation expectations. The reason is that the public does not know
the policy outcome yet; it only observes the policy action. Although this provides
a signal of the central bank’s intentions, it also reﬂects economic disturbances.
Uncertainty about the economic shocks to which the central bank responds makes
the signal noisy, and provides scope for the central bank to create surprise in-
ﬂation and boost output. The public anticipates this and increases its inﬂation
expectations. The central bank takes this into account and pursues a higher level
of inﬂation than socially optimal.
Greater transparency about the economic shocks reduces the opportunity for
surprise inﬂation and therefore reduces the inﬂation bias. In the case of perfect
economic transparency, the inﬂation bias vanishes. When the private sector has
imperfect economic information, less transparency about the central bank’s pref-
erences also reduces the inﬂation bias. Intuitively, greater economic transparency
and/or more preference uncertainty make the policy instrument a better signal of
the central bank’s intentions, so inﬂation expectations become more sensitive to it.
1Petra M. Geraats, Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge,
CB3 9DD, United Kingdom. Email: Petra.Geraats@econ.cam.ac.uk.
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- 1 -Greater responsiveness of expectations gives the central bank a bigger incentive
to mimic the behavior of a low-inﬂation type to reduce inﬂation expectations. As
a result, an increase in the degree of economic transparency and/or a decrease in
preference transparency reduces the inﬂation bias.
For the commonly adopted information structure in which the private sector
perfectly observes the central bank’s preferences but has imperfect information
about the economic shocks, the inﬂation bias is in fact largest. Intuitively, the
information asymmetry on the economic situation creates the opportunity to pur-
sue surprise inﬂation, whereas complete preference transparency eliminates the
possibility of mimicking.
The model is in the tradition of strategic monetary policy games. However,
it constitutes a signiﬁcant departure from the framework introduced by Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and formalized by Barro and Gordon (1983a). The essence
of these models is that the public’s inﬂation expectations are ﬁxed when the cen-
tral bank determines monetary policy, and held constant while the central bank’s
actions take effect. Given the long lags associated with the effects of monetary
policy, this implies that people’s expectations are not adjusted for up to one or
two years. This assumption seems unrealistic. Instead, this paper reverses the
timing and assumes that people form their inﬂation expectations after the central
bank sets the policy instrument. Thus, instead of the usual Nash equilibrium, this
paper considers the extensive-form game in which the central bank is Stackelberg
leader.
There is an extensive literature on the inﬂation bias. Kydland and Prescott
(1977) suggest central banks should abandon discretionary policy and commit to
rules. The contribution of this paper is to show that precommitment is not sufﬁ-
cient to eliminate the inﬂation bias when there is asymmetric information about
the economic disturbances reﬂected in the policy instrument. The role of private
information under commitment is also addressed by Canzoneri (1985). He an-
alyzes ﬂexible targeting rules that allow the central bank to respond to private
information but reduce the inﬂation bias caused by dynamic inconsistency. Like
Barro and Gordon (1983b), he relies on reputation effects generated by retaliating
trigger strategies. This paper, however, analyzes how private information gives
rise to an inﬂation bias when the central bank commits to a policy action every
period, so there is no time-inconsistency problem. In addition, it follows the repu-
- 2 -tation literature of signaling and rational updating of people’s expectations based
on the central bank’s actions (Backus and Drifﬁll 1985, Barro 1986).
The paper also underscores the salient role of transparency. The effects of
transparency on the inﬂation bias are similar to the results obtained in models with
dynamic inconsistency. Faust and Svensson (2000) show that greater transparency
on control errors which improves the interpretation of policy outcomes tends to
reduce the inﬂation bias. Geraats (2000) analyzes transparency on the economic
information reﬂected in policy actions, like the present paper.
The inﬂation bias in this paper can be eliminated by addressing its sources:
the central bank’s preferences or asymmetric information on the economy. To the
extent that complete economic transparency is not feasible, society could appoint
‘conservative’ central bankers that put less weight on output stimulation (Rogoff
1985) or pursue a lower inﬂation target (Svensson 1997). Another possibility is to
have incentive schemes or contracts for central bankers (Walsh 1995, Persson and
Tabellini 1993).
Most of the literature has considered strategic monetary policy games in which
the private sector and the central bank move either simultaneously, or sequentially
with the private sector acting ﬁrst. An exception is Goodhart and Huang (1998)
who analyze an inﬁnite-horizon model with policy lags, output persistence and/or
overlapping wage contracts. They implicitly assume preference uncertainty but
economic transparency. They show that a model with merely monetary policy
lags eliminates the inﬂation bias. The present paper explains that this no longer
holds when there is some economic uncertainty.
An exception to the usual Nash strategy in monetary policy games is presented
by Bas ¸ar and Salmon (1990). They adopt the model by Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986), a repeated simultaneous-move game with private information on the cen-
tral bank’s preferences, but analyze the Stackelberg solution in which the central
bank acts as the (strategic) leader. Simultaneity of actions implies that the pri-
vate sector cannot use the policy instrument to update its expectations in the same
period. But in the Stackelberg solution, the central bank takes into account the
effect of its policy rule on inﬂation expectations, so the inﬂation bias is zero on
average. Their analysis presumes that every period, the central bank can precom-
mit to a policy rule that depends on its unobservable type. In contrast, this paper
features an extensive-form game in which the central bank commits through a
- 3  -policy action. Although the central bank is the Stackelberg leader, the presence
of asymmetric information on economic disturbances makes the policy action a
noisy signal and gives the central bank an incentive to create excessive inﬂation.
The basic model in which commitment gives rise to an inﬂation bias is pre-
sented in section 1. The appendix formally analyzes some special cases. In addi-
tion, it presents a variation on the basic model, which features a monetary, Lucas-
typetransmissionmechanism, andshowsthatusingamechanismbasedonthereal
interest rate leads to the same qualitative conclusions. The results are discussed
in section 2. Section 3 concludes that in the presence of policy lags, central banks
do not need policy rules to eliminate the inﬂation bias. Instead, economic trans-
parency about the shocks to which they are responding sufﬁces while maintaining
complete ﬂexibility.
1 Model





2 +  (y  ¯ y); (1)
where isinﬂation,  thecentralbank’sinﬂationtarget, y realoutput, ¯ y thenatural
rate of output, and  the relative weight on output stimulation ( > 0). The central
bank’s inﬂation target  is stochastic:   N (¯ ;2
) with 2
 > 0. The economic
structure is determined by the quantity equation
 = m + "v (2)
and the Lucas supply equation
y = ¯ y + b(  
e) + "s (3)
where m denotes money supply growth and e the market’s inﬂation expectations;
"s is a supply shock and "v can be interpreted as a velocity shock. The economic
disturbances are stochastic: "s  N (0;2
s) and "v  N (0;2
v), with 2
s > 0 and
2
v > 0; , "s and "v are assumed to be independent. The parameter b is the extent
to which surprise inﬂation stimulates output.
- 4 -The timing is as follows. Nature draws the central bank’s inﬂation target  and
the economic shocks "s and "v, which are only known to the central bank. The
central bank sets the money supply growth m. Subsequently, the public observes
money supply growth, and it forms its inﬂation expectations e. Finally, inﬂation
 and output y are realized.
There is asymmetric information about the central bank’s preferences. So, the
public uses the money supply m to infer the central bank’s type . This is compli-
cated by the presence of asymmetric information about the economic disturbances
"s and "v. It is assumed that people have rational expectations. Formally, the in-
formation set available to the public when it forms its inﬂation expectations e
equals fm;Ωg, where Ω  f;b; ¯ y;¯ ;2
;2
s;2
vg summarizes the structure and
parameters of the model.
To ﬁnd the solution to this game, it is crucial to know how the public’s inﬂation
expectations e are affected by the central bank’s actions m. It is postulated that

e = u0 + umm: (4)
It is shown below that this is consistent with rational expectations. The central
bank maximizes the objective function (1) with respect to m subject to (3) and
(2), and incorporating the updating of inﬂation expectations (4). The ﬁrst order
condition with respect to m implies
m =  + (1  um)b  "v: (5)
Money supply is increasing in the central bank’s inﬂation target  and decreasing
in the velocity shock "v. It does not depend on the supply shock "s because the
central bank does not aim to stabilize output with its objective (1). Using (2) gives
 =  + (1  um)b: (6)
The economic interpretation of this equation is that it equalizes the marginal costs
and beneﬁts of an increase in the money supply m. The marginal cost in terms
of higher inﬂation is   ; the marginal beneﬁt from the stimulation of output
equals b(d=dm  de=dm) = b(1  um).
Notice that the usual inﬂationary bias of discretionary monetary policy in the
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a) model,  =  +
- 5 -b, obtains if um = 0. This could be because the central bank is myopic in
the sense that it fails to incorporate the effect of its actions m on the public’s
inﬂation expectations e. Alternatively, the public may not be able to use the
policy instrument to update its inﬂation expectations, like in a simultaneous-move
game, so that de=dm = 0. In the case of commitment to a money supply rule,
the public adjusts its inﬂation expectations fully, d=dm = de=dm = 1, so
there is no inﬂation bias.
Rational expectations imply that e = E[jm;Ω]. Substituting (2) gives

e = m + E["vjm;Ω]: (7)
Although the public forms its inﬂation expectations after the central bank moves,
the policy action m is not fully informative about the policy outcome  because
the public does not observe the velocity shock "v. However, the public realizes
that the money supply reﬂects the central bank’s knowledge of the shock, and
it tries to infer the velocity shock "v from the money supply m. Since m has a
normal distribution by (5), (7) produces










Note that (8) corresponds to the postulated updating equation (4), so this is a
rational expectations equilibrium. It follows from (5) that Covf"v;mjΩg = 2
v
and Var[mjΩ] = 2
 + 2








so 0 < um < 1.2 The updating coefﬁcient um suggests that the signal extraction
problem can be recast in another way. Inﬂation  depends on the unknown inﬂa-
tion target  by (6). To form its inﬂation expectations, the public uses the noisy
signal m to infer . The updating coefﬁcient um is positive as people ascribe a
higher money supply to a higher inﬂation target and therefore expect a higher level
of inﬂation. The magnitude of the updating coefﬁcient reﬂects the accuracy of the
signal m and is increasing in the signal-to-noise ratio 2
=2
v.
















- 6 -Using (5) and (8), gives the public’s inﬂation expectations
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A central bank with a higher inﬂation target causes higher inﬂation expectations,
but not to the full extent because the money supply is considered a noisy signal.
An increase in the velocity shock "v reduces inﬂation expectations because the
decrease in the money supply is partly attributed to a lower inﬂation target.
Substituting um into (6) gives the level of inﬂation







Clearly, there is an inﬂation bias even though there is no time-inconsistency prob-
lem. Although the central bank moves ﬁrst, it is still able to cause surprise inﬂa-
tion because of the presence of asymmetric information about the velocity shock.
People anticipate this and increase their inﬂation expectations for any level of the
money supply. To prevent a drop in output, the central bank has to increase the
money supply, which gives rise to the inﬂation bias.
Finally, using (10), (9) and (3), output equals












b"v + "s: (11)
A central bank that has a higher than expected inﬂation target ( > ¯ ) succeeds in
boosting output. However, rational expectations ensure that the expected value of
output equals the natural rate: E[yjΩ] = ¯ y.
It follows from (10) that the inﬂation bias in this Stackelberg game has its
source in (a) the objective to stimulate output beyond the natural rate ( > 0),
just like in the Nash game; and (b) asymmetric information on the economic dis-
turbances that affect the policy instrument, or simply lack of ‘economic trans-
parency’.3 In the presence of some economic uncertainty (2
v > 0), the degree of
3Note that only velocity shocks (2
v) matter and that uncertainty about the supply shock (2
s) is
immaterial. The reason is that the policy instrument m is not affected by supply shocks "s, so they
do not create any noise. However, this is speciﬁc to the transmission mechanism in this model.
For the real-interest rate mechanism analyzed in appendix A.3, uncertainty about supply shocks
does matter.
- 7  -preference uncertainty (2
) also matters. So, let us analyze how they affect the
inﬂation bias.
A lower variance of velocity shocks 2
v reduces the inﬂation bias since there is
less opportunity for surprises. An alternative explanation is that a reduction in the
uncertainty about the economic disturbances that affect the central bank’s actions
makes the policy instrument a more accurate signal of the inﬂation target. So,
people adjust their inﬂation expectations more in response to the policy instru-
ment. This makes it more beneﬁcial for the central bank to mimic the behavior of
a low-inﬂation type. As a result, the inﬂation bias is lower. This argument is anal-
ogous to the effect of reputation in dynamic monetary policy games: The central
bank changes its current actions to affect (future) inﬂation expectations and obtain
a more favorable output-inﬂation trade-off.
Similarly, greateruncertaintyaboutthecentralbank’spreferences2
 increases
the responsiveness of inﬂation expectations to the money supply. This reduces
the payoff of increasing the money supply and leads to a lower inﬂation bias.
In the limit, as 2
 ! 1, the inﬂation bias completely vanishes. On the other
hand, for 2
v ! 1 the money supply becomes so unreliable that people no longer
pay attention to it. As a consequence, the simultaneous-move outcome obtains:
 =  + b.
It is interesting to consider the limiting cases of perfect economic transparency
(2
v ! 0) and preference transparency (2
 ! 0).4 In the case of economic trans-
parency, the policy instrument is a perfect signal of the central bank’s type, so
um = 1. This provides the maximum incentive for the central bank to reduce
the money supply to lower inﬂation expectations. It appears that the disadvantage
of higher inﬂation expectations exactly offsets the temptation to boost output by
creating surprise inﬂation. As a result, there is no inﬂation bias. Alternatively, the
absence of economic uncertainty eliminates the possibility of surprise inﬂation
and thereby the inﬂation bias.
In the case of preference transparency, the private sector directly observes the
central bank’s inﬂation target . When there is some economic uncertainty, the
4Note that the information set available to the public changes in these cases. See appendix
A.1 and A.2 for formal derivations of the outcomes. In particular, it should be mentioned that
in the case of economic transparency, E["vjΩ] = "v so that (9) and (11) reduce to e =  and
y = ¯ y + "s, respectively.
- 8 -public no longer relies on the noisy policy instrument to update its expectations
on , so um = 0. This means that the outcome is the same as in the simultaneous-
move game:  =  + b.5 Intuitively, the central bank realizes that people do
not pay attention to its policy actions, so it feels tempted to generate inﬂation sur-
prises. However, the public anticipates this and increases its inﬂation expectations
accordingly. The result is the full inﬂation bias. From an economic perspective,
the central bank can no longer beneﬁt from the reputation effect of a reduction in
the money supply, so there is nothing to counteract the incentive to create surprise
inﬂation.
Finally, there is the case of perfect economic and preference transparency.
Given that merely economic transparency gives no inﬂation bias, but merely pref-
erencetransparencygivesthefullbias, thisreallyisaknife-edgedcase.6 Itappears
that the combination of economic and preference transparency eliminates the in-
ﬂation bias. Intuitively, although preference transparency removes the possibility
of mimicking, the presence of economic transparency makes inﬂation surprises
impossible.
However, it should be noted that this outcome of no inﬂation bias is extremely
sensitiveto theassumptionsmade. Introducingtheslightesteconomicuncertainty,
the Stackelberg outcome turns into the worst case of a full inﬂation bias. Or,
assuming the public incurs tiny costs associated with the veriﬁcation of a state
variable also gives the worst outcome.7 The only way in which the result is robust
is that introducing some preference uncertainty does not affect the outcome.
To summarize, when the central bank commits to a policy action, there is still
an inﬂation bias whenever there is lack of economic transparency in the sense
that the private sector is uncertain about the economic disturbances to which the
central bank responds. In that case, greater transparency about the central bank’s
preferences actually increases the inﬂation bias. On the other hand, greater eco-
nomic transparency reduces the inﬂation bias, and it completely vanishes in the
case of perfect economic transparency.
5One may be tempted to argue that preference transparency in this model implies that the
public has perfect foresight and cannot be fooled (e = ), so that the central bank maximizes
W = 1
2 (  )
2 and  = . Appendix A.2 explains why this reasoning is incorrect.
6See Appendix A.2 for a formal analysis.
7See appendix A.2 for the formal arguments.
- 9 -2 Discussion
The monetary policy game introduced in this paper assumes that the central bank
precommitsitselfandmovesﬁrstthroughapolicyaction. Thisreﬂectstheimplicit
assumption of policy lags, which are considered to be signiﬁcant in monetary pol-
icy. This gives the private sector the opportunity to respond to the central bank’s
actions, which in turn affects the policy outcome. Thus, the model captures the
important feature that policymakers need to incorporate the effect of their policy
actions on the public’s expectations. In contrast to previous literature on reputa-
tion in a multi-period context, it is assumed that the adjustment of expectations
inﬂuences the effect of current policy actions on the policy outcome. In other
words, the response of private sector expectations is considered an integral part of
the policy transmission mechanism.
The model starts from the usual premise in the time-inconsistency literature
that the central bank has an objective function that is (at least locally) increasing in
output. Furthermore, it is assumed that there is asymmetric information between
thecentralbankandtheprivatesector. Inthebasicmodelofsection1therearetwo
information asymmetries. First, the private sector is uncertain about the central
bank’spreferences. Thiscouldbeinterpretedasafundamentalcredibilityproblem
inherent to the impossibility to observe intentions directly. However, the inﬂation
bias under commitment is not caused by preference uncertainty. Second, there is
asymmetric information about economic disturbances. This is the driving force of
the inﬂation bias. Romer and Romer (2000) provideevidencefor such asymmetric
information. They show that (conﬁdential) Federal Reserve forecasts of inﬂation
are superior to those of commercial forecasters, even at a short horizon of one
or two quarters ahead. This suggests that central banks may indeed have private
information about the economy. However, it should be emphasized that the results
in this paper do not rely on the central bank having superior information. The only
thing that matters is that there is uncertainty about the economic information that
the central bank uses for its policy decisions.
The model in section 1 adopts a monetary, Lucas-type transmission mecha-
nism in which the central bank directly controls inﬂation through its instrument,
money supply growth. Output can only be affected through inﬂation surprises.
However, the signaling intuition suggests that the results do not depend on the
- 10 -need for inﬂation surprises to stimulate output; instead, they are driven by the
rewards of investing in ‘reputation’ in the form of lower inﬂation expectations.
Appendix A.3 shows that the same effects apply to a real interest rate mechanism.
The policy instrument is the nominal interest rate, which allows the central bank
to inﬂuence the ex ante real interest rate and thereby output. Inﬂation is controlled
only indirectly through the output gap and it is affected by the public’s inﬂation
expectations. The same conclusions hold as before. Economic uncertainty, in this
case about the demand and supply shocks that are reﬂected in the interest rate,
creates an inﬂation bias that exacerbates as the uncertainty increases; political
uncertainty reduces the inﬂation bias.
The paper suggests which kind of transparency is needed to eliminate the in-
ﬂation bias. A central bank should disclose the economic shocks that affect its
policy decision. So, the relevant information depends on the policy instrument
that the central bank adopts; velocity shocks in case of the money supply, and
demand and supply shocks for the nominal interest rate. The latter could be con-
veniently conveyed through the publication of conditional central bank forecasts
of output and inﬂation that are based on a constant level of the nominal interest
rate and private sector inﬂation expectations.8
Notice that the model presumes that there is no private information about the
structure of the economy. If there is asymmetric information about the economic
model, thepolicyinstrumenttypicallybecomesanoisysignalofthecentralbank’s
intentions and the inﬂation bias reappears. More generally, the inﬂation bias van-
ishesonlywhenthereiscompleteeconomictransparency, thatis, symmetricinfor-
mation about the economic information (data, models, forecasts) on which policy
actions are based.
In addition, the model assumes that the central bank is able to observe eco-
nomic shocks perfectly; there are no forecast errors due to unanticipated shocks.
Introducing such control errors does not affect any of the qualitative results. Fur-
thermore, openness about control errors that affect the implementation of the
central bank’s policy actions, which could be called ‘operational transparency’,
would be immaterial in the present model. The reason is that operational trans-
parency is backward looking and gives clues about the central bank’s past objec-
tives, whereas economic transparency is forward looking and reveals the central
- 11 -
8This follows directly from (21) and (22).bank’s current intentions which determine future inﬂation.9
Finally, it is important to identify the crucial difference between precommit-
ment to policy rules, and commitment in the form of a policy action in this paper.
The central bank commits itself in the sense that it moves ﬁrst. However, mone-
tary policy is still discretionary since the central bank is not bound by a rule; every
period, it decides about the policy action and has the opportunity to respond to
shocks. The difference between policy rules and ‘discretionary precommitment’
lies in the information structure. In both cases, the public effectively observes
the policy action before it forms its expectations and the policy instrument is a
noisy signal of the policy outcome because of economic disturbances. But under
discretionary precommitment, the central bank can exploit this noise to cover up
expansionary policy, which leads to the inﬂation bias. Commitment eliminates
the inﬂation bias only if the policy decision is made under symmetric information
about the economic disturbances that affect the policy instrument. This can be
obtained by rules that determine policy well in advance so that economic shocks
cannot be anticipated, and/or for long enough periods so that the shocks average
out. Alternatively, this can be obtained by discretionary policy in the presence of
policy lags provided the central bank embraces economic transparency by sharing
information on economic disturbances with the private sector.10
3 Conclusion
The time-inconsistency literature suggests that commitment eliminates the inﬂa-
tionary bias of discretionary monetary policy. This paper shows, however, that
precommitment is no sure cure. A simple, static model is presented in which
the central bank moves ﬁrst by setting the policy instrument and the public sub-
sequently forms its inﬂation expectations before the policy actions take effect.
9In a dynamic context with repeated games under economic opaqueness, greater operational
transparency could be useful and reduce the inﬂation bias like in the model by Faust and Svensson
(2000).
10This provides formal support for critics of the time-inconsistency literature, most notably,
Blinder (1998) who states that the academic debate on rules versus discretion “has been barking
up the wrong – or, rather, nonexistent – trees” and has made “insufﬁcient contact with reality”,
and McCallum (1995, 1997) who argues that somehow central banks can ‘just do it’.
- 12 -Thus, the model captures an implicit policy lag. Moreover, it incorporates the
private sector’s response to policy actions into the policy transmission process.
The public uses the policy instrument to infer the central bank’s intentions.
However, economic disturbances make the instrument a noisy signal. This pro-
vides an opportunity for expansionary policy without detection and is the source
of the inﬂation bias.
Greater transparency about the economic shocks to which the central bank
responds makes the public pay closer attention to the central bank’s actions to up-
date its expectations. The central bank takes into account the effect of the private
sector’s inﬂation expectations on the policy outcome. This exerts discipline on
the central bank’s actions and reduces its incentive to stimulate output. Less eco-
nomic uncertainty gives the central bank less scope to stray. In the case of perfect
economic information, the feedback from private sector inﬂation expectations is
so strong that it completely offsets the tendency to create an inﬂation bias.
Greater transparency about the central bank’s preferences actually worsens
the inﬂation bias because it reduces the need for the private sector to focus on the
central bank’s actions, and thereby loosens the grip on the central bank.
The implication for monetary policy is that greater openness should not focus
on conveying the central bank’s objectives, but on explaining its policy actions.
Furthermore, the paper suggests that central banks don’t necessarily need rules;
instead, economictransparencysufﬁcestoeliminatetheinﬂationbias, whilemain-
taining discretionary ﬂexibility. Perhaps, this explains why in practice, central
banks that redesign their policy procedures do not commit to rules, but to inﬂation
reports.
- 13  -A Appendix
The appendix analyzes special cases and a variation on the basic model in sec-
tion 1. Appendix A.1 looks at the case of economic transparency, appendix A.2
discusses preference transparency and appendix A.3 derives the results for a real-
interest rate transmission mechanism.
A.1 Economic Transparency
This appendix derives the outcome of the basic model in section 1 for the spe-
cial case of complete economic transparency. So, 2
s = 2
v = 0, and the infor-
mation set available to the public when it forms its inﬂation expectations equals
fm;"s;"v;Ωg. Assume the following updating equation

e = u0 + umm + us"s + uv"v: (12)
The central bank maximizes the objective function (1) subject to (3) and (2), and
incorporating (12). The ﬁrst order condition with respect to m yields
m =  + (1  um)b  "v (13)
as before. So, using (2)
 =  + (1  um)b: (14)
Rational expectations imply e = E[jm;"v;"s;Ω]. Under economic trans-
parency the public can use the policy instrument m to perfectly infer the inﬂation
target  from (13). Substituting this into (14) gives

e = m + "v:
This is consistent with the postulated updating equation (12) for u0 = 0, um = 1,
us = 0 and uv = 1. So, this corresponds to a rational expectations equilibrium.
Substituting um = 1, it follows that m =   "v, e =  and
 = :
So, in the case of economic transparency there is no inﬂation bias. People cor-
rectly anticipate the level of inﬂation (e = ), so output equals y = ¯ y + "s.
- 14 -A.2 Preference Transparency
This appendix analyzes the outcome of the model in section 1 in the case of pref-




v = 0, and the information set available to the public when it forms
its inﬂation expectations equals f;m;"s;"v;Ωg. It will prove useful to adopt a
solution approach that is similar to the one in section 1 and appendix A.1. So,
postulate the updating equation

e = u0 + u + umm + us"s + uv"v: (15)
The central bank maximizes the objective function (1) subject to (3) and (2), and
incorporating (15). The ﬁrst order condition with respect to m yields
m =  + (1  um)b  "v (16)
as before. So, using (2)
 =  + (1  um)b: (17)
Rational expectations imply e = E[j;m;"v;"s;Ω]. Clearly, the public is
able to perfectly forecast inﬂation. It can do so in (inﬁnitely) many ways: using 
directly; or, using m to solve  from (16) as in appendix A.1; or, any combination
of both methods. More formally, one can write

e = ( + (1  um)b) + (1  )(m + "v) (18)
where 0    1. This is consistent with the postulated updating equation
(15) and the outcomes obtained by matching coefﬁcients correspond to rational
expectations equilibria. This gives u0 = (1  um)b, u = , um = 1  ,
us = 0 and uv = 1. Note that every way of constructing inﬂation expectations
leads to perfect foresight:

e = : (19)











where ΩP = f;m;"v;"s;Ωg denotes the information set available to the private
sector. This means that the private sector is completely indifferent among the
methods  2 [0;1].
- 15 -The central bank realizes this and it has the advantage of moving ﬁrst. So, it
chooses to focus on the method  that maximizes its objective (1). Substituting






As a result, the central bank settles on  = 0, or um = 1. Therefore the Stack-
elberg equilibrium in the case of perfect economic and preference transparency is
no inﬂation bias:
 = :
However, this outcome is not very robust. The source of this sensitivity lies in
the private sector’s indifference among all methods . Introducing small changes
to the information structure or the payoff can easily shift the outcome from the
best to the worst outcome. First, the effect of small costs associated with the
veriﬁcation of a state variable is discussed. Subsequently, a (slight) information
asymmetry about economic disturbances is analyzed.
Suppose the public experiences a small cost  for each state variable it uses
( > 0). This could arise from costs of data collection or information processing.
Let s(S) denote the number of state variables that the public decides to include
in its information set ΩP (S), where S = f;m;"s;"vg denotes the set of state









s(S). Since the public is able to forecast inﬂation perfectly (e = ) for any
method , it chooses the method that relies on the smallest number of state vari-
ables.11 So, the public prefers  = 1 (u0 = b, u = 1, um = us = uv = 0) and
only uses the inﬂation target . As a result, the outcome is  =  + b. Notice
that this even holds for tiny costs  > 0. It appears that this minor change in the
public’s payoff has a big effect on the Stackelberg equilibrium; it goes from the
best to the worst possible outcome.
Consider the case in which there is some uncertainty about the velocity shock
(2
v > 0). This means that "v is no longer in the public’s information set ΩP =
11This amounts to the minimum state variable condition that McCallum (1983) proposes in the
case of multiple rational expectations equilibria.
- 16 -f;m;"s;Ωg, soitmustbethatuv = 0.12 NotethatE["vjΩP] = 0andVar["vjΩP] =
2
v. The public knows that given its updating equation (15), optimization by the

















v > 0, the private sector sets um = 0. Regarding the other coefﬁcients,
the updating equation should hold for any value of  and "s, so the private sector’s
objective WP is maximized for u0 = b, u = 1 and us = 0. As a consequence,
the updating equation becomes e =  + b. In other words, the public decides
to ignore the money supply m because a noisy variable "v is required to interpret
it. Instead, it relies on the central bank’s inﬂation target, but this gives the central
bank an incentive to create unexpected inﬂation to boost output, and leads to an
inﬂation bias.13
The result that the inﬂation bias rears its ugly head again if there is some
economic uncertainty may seem surprising. After all, the public has perfect fore-
sight: e = . One may think that the central bank therefore maximizes W =
1
2 (  )
2 so that  =  and there is no inﬂation bias. However, this argument
is incorrect. The reason is that the central bank does not set the policy outcome
, but a (noisy) policy instrument m. Suppose, counterfactually, that  =  and
e =  is the equilibrium outcome. As the Stackelberg leader, the central bank
incorporates the public’s response e = . So, the central bank sets the policy
instrument m to maximize W = 1
2 (m + "v  )
2 + b(m + "v  ), which
yields m =  +b"v. This corresponds to  =  +b, contradicting the initial
claim that  =  is the equilibrium outcome.
12It seems that "v could be solved from m and  using (16). However, when the public decides
on the optimal updating coefﬁcients, um is a variable. So, "v cannot be inferred ex ante, only ex
post.
13Similarly, one can verify the results obtained in section 1 and appendix A.1. Uncertainty about
 with ΩP = fm;"s;"v;Ωg, gives (u = 0) um = 1, us = 0, uv = 1 and u0 = 0. Unobserv-
ability of the money supply (like in a simultaneous-move game) with ΩP = f;"s;"v;Ωg, gives
(um = 0) u = 1, us = 0, uv = 0 and u0 = b. When only the money supply is observed so that
ΩP = fm;Ωg, the private sector maximizes WP = 1
2

































tainty about the supply shock "s is immaterial because the private sector always sets us = 0.
- 17  -The reason that there is an inﬂation bias is that the public does not directly
observe the policy outcome , but instead a policy action m that is an imperfect
signal because of the presence of unobservable velocity shocks "v. The private
sector is not able to tell whether a high level of the money supply m is due to a
low velocity shock "v or bound to lead to high inﬂation . This gives the central
bank the opportunity to create surprise inﬂation, which it exploits in an attempt
to stimulate output. The private sector anticipates that the central bank faces this
temptation and expects an inﬂation bias. The central bank must follow suit to
prevent a reduction in output.
When there is perfect transparency about the economic disturbances, however,
there is no scope for surprise inﬂation. The public can use the money supply
m and the velocity shock "v to forecast inﬂation. In that case, the central bank
incorporatese = m+"v andtheobjective(1)reducestoW = 1
2 (m + "v  )
2,
so that  = . Instead, the public could ignore the money supply and use the
inﬂation target, in which case it expects the inﬂation bias, e =  + b. In either
case, the private sector is able to forecast inﬂation perfectly (e = ), so it is
indifferent. The central bank moves ﬁrst and it decides to behave according to the
former case because it is more beneﬁcial; the public has no reason not to comply,
so that the Stackelberg outcome is  = .
The striking result that even the slightest economic uncertainty has such a
sharp, negative effect when there is perfect transparency about the central bank’s
preferences reﬂects a more general property of Stackelberg outcomes. Bagwell
(1995) shows that the ﬁrst-mover advantage that prevails in games of perfect in-
formation vanishes when the follower observes the leader’s action with even a
slight amount of imprecision.
A.3 Real Interest Rate Transmission
This section analyzes the basic model in section 1 under a different transmission
mechanism. Instead of the monetary, Lucas-type mechanism, it employs the real
interest rate transmission. The structure of the economy is summarized by the IS
relation
y = ¯ y  a(i  
e  ¯ r) + "d (21)









where i is the nominal interest rate, ¯ r the long run real interest rate, "d a demand
shock, and a the sensitivity of output to the ex ante real interest rate (a > 0).
Assume that "d  N (0;2
d), "s  N (0;2
s) and   N (¯ ;2
), and that "d, "s
and  are independent.
The timing is as follows. Nature draws the central bank’s inﬂation target  and
the economic shocks "d and "s, which are only known to the central bank. Then,
the central bank sets the interest ratei. Subsequently, the public observes the inter-
est rate, and it forms its inﬂation expectations e. Finally, output y and inﬂation 
are realized. Formally, the information set available to the public when it forms its




Again, the updating of inﬂation expectations based on the policy instrument i
plays a crucial role. It is postulated that

e = u + vi; (23)
which appears to be consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium. The cen-
tral bank maximizes its objective (1) subject to (21) and (22), and incorporates the
effect of its policy actions on the public’s inﬂation expectations through (23). The
ﬁrst order condition implies
i =
a + b
(1  v)a  vb
u +
a
(1  v)a  vb
¯ r 
b
(1  v)a  vb
 (24)

ab2 (1  v)
((1  v)a  vb)
2 +
1
(1  v)a  vb
"d 
1
(1  v)a  vb
"s:
Substituting this into (23), (21) and (22), gives the level of inﬂation
 =  + b
(1  v)a
(1  v)a  vb
: (25)
The usual inﬂation bias,  =  +b, arises if the policy instrument i has no effect
on inﬂation expectations (v = 0).
Rational expectations imply that e = E[ji;Ω]. Substituting (25) and using
the fact that i is normally distributed by (24),

e = E[jΩ] +
Covf;ijΩg
Var[ijΩ]
(i  E[ijΩ]) + b
(1  v)a
(1  v)a  vb
:
- 19 -Using(24), Covf;ijΩg = b
(1v)avb2





Matching coefﬁcients with (23) and rearranging gives the updating coefﬁcient in














the nominal interest rate is a poor signal of the central bank’s inﬂation target, so
inﬂation expectations are not very responsive. This means that an increase in the
nominal interest rate leads to a higher ex ante real interest rate, which reduces
inﬂation. As a result, there is a negative relation between the nominal interest rate




), a higher nominal interest rate is associated with a higher
inﬂation target which induces an increase in inﬂation expectations (v > 0).16,17
Substituting v into (25) produces









So, under economic opaqueness, there is an inﬂation bias, but it is smaller than
with the conventional timing of Kydland and Prescott (1977)
in which case inﬂation equals  =  + b. Observe that less economic uncer-
tainty (smaller 2
d and 2
s) reduces the inﬂation bias. In the limit, 2
d;2
s ! 0, the
inﬂation bias is completely eliminated like in the model in section 1 with perfect
economic transparency.
14Note that in the special case in which 2
d+2
s = ab2
, no (pure-strategy) rational expectations
equilibrium exists.




16In fact, v > 1 for 2
d + 2
s > 0. Inﬂation expectations are so responsive that they rise by
more than the nominal interest rate and depress the ex ante real interest rate. The latter equals
r  i  e = (1  v)i  u, so @r=@i > 0 for v < 1, and @r=@i  0 for v  1.
17For the quadratic objective function W = 1
2 (  )
2  1
2 (y  ¯ y) one can show that 0 <
v < 1 for reasonable parameter values. This implies that an increase in the nominal interest rate
leads to a higher ex ante real interest rate and is associated with contractionary monetary policy,
while it causes an increase in inﬂation expectations. This is consistent with empirical ﬁndings for
the United States reported by Romer and Romer (2000) and could explain the paradoxical fact that
long-term interest rates tend to rise in response to tighter monetary policy.
- 20 -Also note that the limiting case of political certainty (2
 ! 0) leads to the full
inﬂationary bias:  =  +b. In the case of both political certainty (2
 ! 0) and
economic transparency (2
d;2
s ! 0) there is no inﬂation bias:  = . However,
the same caveat applies as in appendix A.2.
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